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Secure Precise Wireless Transmission with
Random-Subcarrier-Selection-based Directional
Modulation Transmit Antenna Array
Feng Shu, Xiaomin Wu, Jinsong Hu, Riqing Chen, and Jiangzhou Wang
Abstract—In this paper, a practical wireless transmission
scheme is proposed to transmit confidential messages to the
desired user securely and precisely by the joint use of multi-
ple techniques including artificial noise (AN) projection, phase
alignment (PA)/beamforming, and random subcarrier selection
(RSCS) based on OFDM, and directional modulation (DM),
namely RSCS-OFDM-DM. This RSCS-OFDM-DM scheme pro-
vides an extremely low-complexity structures for the transmitter
and desired receiver and makes the secure and precise wireless
transmission realizable in practice. For illegal eavesdroppers, the
receive power of confidential messages is so weak that their
receivers cannot intercept these confidential messages successfully
once it is corrupted by AN. In such a scheme, the design of
phase alignment/beamforming vector and AN projection matrix
depend intimately on the desired direction angle and distance. It
is particularly noted that the use of RSCS leads to a significant
outcome that the receive power of confidential messages mainly
concentrates on the small neighboring region around the desired
receiver and only small fraction of its power leaks out to the
remaining large broad regions. This concept is called secure pre-
cise transmission. The probability density function of real-time
receive signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) is derived.
Also, the average SINR and its tight upper bound are attained.
The approximate closed-form expression for average secrecy rate
is derived by analyzing the first-null positions of SINR and
clarifying the wiretap region. From simulation and analysis, it
follows that the proposed scheme actually can achieve a secure
and precise wireless transmission of confidential messages in line-
of-propagation channel, and the derived theoretical formula of
average secrecy rate is verified to coincide with the exact one
well for medium and large scale transmit antenna array or in
the low and medium SNR regions.
Index Terms—Secure precise transmission, phase alignment,
random-subcarrier-selection, directional modulation, SINR
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, secure physical-layer wireless transmis-
sion has increasingly become an extremely important research
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field in both academia and industry [1]–[8]. As a key-less
physical layer secure transmit way, directional modulation
(DM) is attracting an ever-growing interest in [9]–[13] and
has made substantial progression in many aspects by using
antenna array with the help of aided artificial noise (AN) [14]–
[16]. In [12], [13], the authors propose an actively driven DM
array of utilizing analog radio frequency (RF) phase shifters
or switches, which exists some fundamental weaknesses such
as requirement of high-speed RF switches and high com-
plexity of design process. To overcome those disadvantages,
instead of the RF frontend, the DM is synthesized on the
baseband by the AN-aided orthogonal vector method in [14].
To enhance security, the symbol-level precoder in [10] is
proposed by using the concept of constructive interference in
directional modulation with the goal of reducing the energy
consumption at transmitter. Taking direction measurement
error into account, the authors in [15], [16] propose two new
robust DM synthesis methods for two different application
scenarios: single-desired user and multi-user broadcasting by
exploiting the statistical properties of direction measurement
error. Compared to existing non-robust methods, the proposes
robust methods can achieve an order-of-magnitude bit error
rate (BER) performance improvement along desired drections.
In general, the DM may achieve a high performance gain along
the desired directions via beamforming and provide a secure
transmission by seriously degrading the undesired directions
by artificial noise(AN) projection.
However, the major disadvantage of DM is that its beam-
forming method only depends on direction angle and is
independent of distance. Therefore, as an eavesdropper moves
within the main beam of the desired direction, it can readily
intercept the confidential messages towards the desired direc-
tion. This will result in a serious secure problem.
To address such a problem, the authors in [17], [18] pro-
pose a novel frequency diversity array model. The frequency
increments are randomly (instead of linearly) assigned to all
antenna-array elements, which is called a random frequency
diverse array (RFDA) [19]. In [18], the authors propose a
RFDA based directional modulation with aided AN. This
scheme can achieve a secure precise wireless transmission.
That is, the confidential beamforming vectors for desired
users and AN projection matrix for eavesdroppers rely heavily
on both direction and distance. In other words, by making
use of RFDA plus DM, the confidential messages can be
securely and precisely transmitted towards a given posi-
tion (direction and distance) with only a small fraction of
2confidential power radiating outside the small neighborhood
around the desired position. Actually, the frequency diverse
array has been widely investigated in RADAR field [20],
[21]. In [22], the RFDA concept has also been employed
to construct OFDM transmitter and achieved secure wireless
communication in free space. However, as the number NT
of transmit antennas tends to medium-scale and large-scale,
the desired transmitter and receiver require a high-complexity
transmit and receive structure. For example, at desired re-
ceiver, NT RF chains, or one RF chain with NT matched
filter are required to coherently combine NT parallel random
independent subchannels of all NT frequency bands. This NT -
RF-chain structure will dramatically increase the circuit cost
at both transmitter and receiver for medium-scale and large-
scale directional modulation system. This motivates us pro-
pose a low-complexity structure of using random-subcarrier-
selection (RSCS) array based on OFDM technique instead of
RFDA with the help of AN projection and phase-alignment
at transmitter. The proposed scheme can easily implement
the DM synthesis at transmitter and coherent combining at
receiver using IFFT/FFT operations, respectively. Thus, this
new structure can significantly reduce the circuit cost and make
the secure precise communication feasible and applicable. Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
• To address the problem of circuit complexity at receiver,
we propose a new scheme of replacing random frequency
diverse by random subcarrier selection based on OFDM and
DM (RSCS-OFDM-DM). At desired receiver, the FFT/IFFT
operation will reduce NT RF chains to only one. This simple
structure will significantly save the circuit budget in the
medium-scale and large-scale systems.
• At transmitter, phase alignment in frequency-domain is
combined with RSCS to constructively synthesize the NT
frequency-shifted versions of transmit signal at desired re-
ceiver and destructively at eavesdroppers. The AN projection
is used to further degrade the performance of eavesdroppers.
• In the scenario that AN and channel noise have ap-
proximately the same receive power, the probability density
function (PDF) of receive signal-to-interference-and-noise ra-
tio (SINR) is first derived. Subsequently, the average SINR
expression is presented by using the derived PDF.
• The approximate closed-form expression for average
secrecy rate is derived by analyzing the first-null position
and clarifying the wiretap region. This theoretical formula is
verified to be valid in medium and large scale transmit antenna
array and almost independent of SNR. Additionally, in the low
and medium SNR regions, the derived expression is shown to
coincide with the exact one well.
• By simulation and analysis, we find that the receive con-
fidential message power forms a high SINR peak around the
desired position and shows a very small leakage to other wide
regions. In other words, this gathers almost all confidential
message power at a small neighbourhood around the desired
position and at the same time leads to an extremely low receive
SINR at eavesdropper positions by AN projection, RSCS and
phase alignment at transmitter, which may successfully destroy
the interception of eavesdroppers.
The remainder are organized as follows: Section II de-
scribes the system model of the proposed RSCS-OFDM-
DM and proves its feasibility. The AN-aided and range-
angle-dependent beamforming scheme for RSCS-OFDM-DM
is presented in Section III. Here, we analyze the PDF of the
receive SINR and its means. Also, we derive the theoretical
formula for average secrecy rate by using the desired SINR and
upper bound of eavesdropper SINR. Section IV presents the
simulation results and analysis. Finally, we make a conclusion
in Section V.
Notations: throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and
scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper case, bold lower
case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , and (·)H denote
transpose and conjugate transpose respectively. The operation
‖ · ‖ and | · | denote the norm of a vector and modulus of a
complex number. The notation E{·} refers to the expectation
operation. Matrices IN denotes the N×N identity matrix and
0M×N denotes M ×N matrix of all zeros.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we propose a secure precise system struc-
ture as shown in Fig. 1. This system consists of OFDM,
random-subcarrier-selection (RSCS) and DM. In Fig. 1, the
RSCS-OFDM-DM communication system includes a legiti-
mate transmitter equipped with one NT -element linear antenna
array, a desired receiver, and several eavesdroppers, which lie
at different positions from the desired position and is not
shown in Fig. 1, with each receiver having single receive
antenna.
The distinct frequency shifts of the same signal/symbol over
different transmit antennas are radiated as indicated in Fig. 1.
For the convenience of implementation of both transmitter and
receiver, all frequency shifts are designed to be orthogonal
with each other in this paper. Thus, the subcarriers in OFDM
systems are a natural choice as shown in Fig. 2. Suppose there
are N subcarriers in our OFDM systems, the set of subcarriers
is the following
Ssub = {fm|fm = fc +m∆f, (m = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1)} ,
(1)
where fc is the reference frequency, and ∆f is the subchannel
bandwidth. We assume N∆f ≪ fc in this paper. In our
system, the total bandwidth is B = N∆f . The corresponding
total subcarrier index set is defined as follows
SN = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. (2)
NT random subcarriers is chosen from SN , allocated to NT
transmit antennas individually, and represented as SNT
SNT ⊆ SN , |SNT | = NT . (3)
Now, we define a chosen subcarrier index function η(•)
as a mapping from the set of transmit antenna indices
{1, 2, · · · , NT } to the chosen subcarrier set
SNT = {η(n)|n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NT }} , (4)
where η(n) ∈ SN . Here, Ts denote the period of OFDM
symbol. Fig. 2 sketches two different kinds of RSCS pat-
terns: block-level and symbol-level. The first pattern shown
3Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of RSCS-OFDM-DM communication system.
in Fig. 2 (a) is called block-level pattern. Every block is made
up of several even one thousand OFDM symbols. Within one
block, the same RSCS pattern is used but the RSCS pattern
will vary from one block to another. The second pattern shown
in Fig. 2 (b) is a symbol-level type. In this type, the RSCS
changes from one OFDM symbol to another. For desired
receivers, the latter provides a more secure protection but also
place a large computational complexity and uncertainty on the
receive active subcarrier test. The former can strike a good
balance among receiver complexity, security and performance
by choosing a proper block size. A large block size means
a high successful detection probability of active subcarriers
and less security because of less randomness. In other words,
a better performance can be achieved. Determining the block
size is a challenging problem beyond the scope of our paper
due to the length limit on paper . Let ∆T be the sampling
interval, we have the next definition
Ts = N∆T = N/B, (5)
∆T = 1/B.
With the above definitions, the transmit RF signal vector from
NT transmit antennas is expressed in vector form as follows
s(t) = [s1(t), s2(t), . . . , sn(t), . . . , sNT (t)]
T
, (6)
with
sn(t) = xke
j(2pifnt+φn), (n = 1, 2, . . . , NT ) (7)
where fn is randomly chosen from subcarrier set Ssub, xk
is the kth transmitted complex digital modulation symbol
with E{x∗kxk} = 1, φn is the initial phase, and the time
variable t ∈ ((k − 1)Ts, kTs). In far-field scenario, after
the transmit signal sn(t) from element n experiences the
line-of -propagation (LoP) channel, the corresponding receive
signal at an arbitrary position (θ,R), where R and θ are the
distance and angle with respect to the first element of transmit
antenna array, respectively, and the first element is chosen as
a reference antenna, can be expressed as
s′n(θ,R; t) = xke
j
(
2pifn
(
t−R(n)
c
)
+φn
)
(8)
= xke
j
(
2pi(fc+∆fη(n))
(
t−R(n)
c
)
+φn
)
,
with
R(n) = R− (n− 1)d cos θ, (9)
where c is the light speed, and d = c/(2fc) is the spacing
between two elements of transmit antenna array, and∆fη(n) is
the subcarrier frequency increment of the nth element. Hence,
the overall received superimposed receive signal from all array
elements can be written as
r′k(θ,R; t) = ρ
NT∑
n=1
s′n(θ,R; t) + n
′
k(t) (10)
= ρxke
j2pifc(t−Rc )
·
NT∑
n=1
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)t−∆fη(n) R
(n)
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θ
c
)
+φn
]
+ n′k(t),
where ρ is the loss path factor in free space or LoP channel,
and proportional to 1R2 , n
′
k(t) is the received channel noise.
Therefore, the received useful signals at desired position
(θD, RD) and undesired position (θE , RE) are expressed as
r′k(θD, RD; t) = ρxke
j2pifc
(
t−RD
c
)
(11)
·
NT∑
n=1
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)t−∆fη(n)
R
(n)
D
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θD
c
)
+φn
]
+ n′k(t),
4(a) Block-level RSCS where RSCS pattern changes from one block to another with each block consisting of
several OFDM symbols
(b) Symbol-level RSCS where RSCS pattern varies from one OFDM symbol to another
Fig. 2. Concept of random-subcarrier-selection for transmitter and receiver.
and
r′k(θE , RE ; t) = ρxke
j2pifc
(
t−RE
c
)
(12)
·
NT∑
n=1
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)t−∆fη(n)
R
(n)
E
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θE
c
)
+φn
]
+ n′k(t).
In what follows, the received RF signal in (10) is first down-
converted to the following analog baseband signal
rk(θ,R, t) = ρxke
j2pifc(t−Rc )e−j2pifc(t−
R
c ) (13)
·
NT∑
n=1
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)t−∆fη(n) R
(n)
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θ
c
)
+φn
]
+ nk(t)
= ρxk
NT∑
n=1
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)t−∆fη(n) R
(n)
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θ
c
)
+φn
]
+ nk(t),
by using a signal down-conversion operation. Sampling the
above analog complex baseband signal by signal bandwidth
B Hz in complex field, then we get the received sampling
signal sequence for kth OFDM symbol as follows
rk[N ] = [rk[0], rk[1], . . . , rk[m], . . . , rk[N − 1]] , (14)
where rk[m] = rk(t)|t=m∆T denotes the mth sample of the
signal with ∆T = 1B as follows
rk[m] = ρxk
NT∑
n=1,η(n)∈SN
(15)
(
e
j
[
2pi
(
∆fη(n)m∆T−∆fη(n) R
(n)
c
+fc
(n−1)d cos θ
c
)
+φn
])
+ nk(m∆T )
= ρxk
NT∑
n=1,η(n)∈SN(
ej[2pi(η(n)(∆fm∆T−∆f
R−(n−1)d cos θ
c
)+ (n−1) cos θ2 )+φn]
)
+ nk(m∆T ),
where ∆fη(n) = η(n)∆f . Hence, the finite sequence rk[N ]
has N samples, and we divide the digital frequency interval
5[0, 2pi] into N equidistant points. Thus, the form of N -points
discrete Fourier transform (DFT) for sample signal is
y(q) = y(ejω)|ω=2piq/N =
N−1∑
m=0
rk[m]e
−j 2pi
N
mq (16)
= ρxk
N−1∑
m=0
NT∑
n=1,η(n)∈SN
e−j
2pi
N
mq
· ej2pi(η(n)∆fm∆T−η(n)∆f R−(n−1)d cos θc + fc(n−1)d cos θc )+jφn
+
N−1∑
m=0
nk(m∆T )e
−j 2pi
N
mq,
where 0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1, and ω ∈ [0, 2pi]. Exchanging the
order of double summations yields equation (17). Considering
0 ≤ |(η(n) − q)| ≤ N , we have
sin[pi(η(n)− q)]
sin[ piN (η(n)− q)]
ej
pi
N
(η(n)−q)(N−1) (18)
=
{
N, q = η(n)
0, q 6= η(n).
The received frequency-domain symbol over subchannel q is
rewritten as
y(q) = ρxk
NT∑
n=1
· (19)(
e
−j2pi
(
∆fη(n)
R(n)
c
− (n−1) cos θ2
)
+jφnNδ [2pi∆f(η(n)− q)]
)
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n),
with
δ(q = η(n)) =
{
1, q = η(n)
0, q 6= η(n). (20)
Based on (19), all the received signals from NT subchannels
are as follows
rk(θ,R, q) = ρxk
NT∑
n=1
· (21)(
e
−j2pi
(
η(n)∆f R
(n)
c
− (n−1) cos θ2
)
+jφnNδ [2pi∆f(η(n)− q)]
)
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n)
= aH(θ,R)diag{x(q)}vk +
NT∑
n=1
nk(n),
where the vector aH(θ,R) is as follows for a target at the
angle θ and range R
aH(θ,R) (22)
=
[
e−j2piψ1 , e−j2piψ2 , ..., e−j2piψn , ..., e−j2piψNT
]
,
where the function ψn is defined by
ψn = η(n)∆f
R(n)
c
− fc (n− 1)d cos θ
c
. (23)
In (21), the vector vk is designed according to the knowledge
of desired receiver position (θD, RD) and defined as
vk =
[
ejφ1 , ejφ2 , . . . , ejφNT
]T
, (24)
and
x(q) = ρxkN (25)
{δ(2pi∆f(η(1)− q)), . . . , δ(2pi∆f(η(NT )− q))} .
Observing (21), to realize the constructive combining of the
NT terms at the desired receiver (θD, RD), it is very apparent
that all initial phases for NT transmit antennas satisfy the
following identity
φ1 − 2piψD1 = φ2 − 2piψD2 = · · ·φNT − 2piψDNT = θ0,
(26)
where θ0 is a constant phase, and
ψDn = ∆fη(n)
R
(n)
D
c
− fc (n− 1)d cos θ
c
(27)
with
R
(n)
D = RD − (n− 1)d cos θ. (28)
This condition will guarantee that all NT signals from NT
antennas with random orthogonal frequency shifts of the same
signal is coherently combined at the desired receiver. The final
receive combined signal at desired receiver is given by
rk(θD, RD) = ρζNTxk +
NT∑
n=1
nk(n), (29)
where ζ = ejθ0N . Additionally, the corresponding signal at
eavesdropper is
rk(θE , RE) = a
H(θE , RE)diag{x(q)}vk +
NT∑
n=1
nk(n) (30)
= ρxk
NT∑
n=1
e
−j2pi
(
∆fη(n)
RE−(n−1)d cos θ
c
− (n−1) cos θE2
)
+jφn
·Nδ [2pi∆f(η(n)− q)] +
NT∑
n=1
nk(n).
Since all phases of signals received from all transmit antennas,
φn − 2pi(∆fη(n)RE−(n−1)d cos θEc − (n−1) cos θE2 ), are viewed
as independently identical distributed (iid) random variables
due to random-subcarrier-selection, the received signal sum
rk(θE , RE)→ 0 as NT tends to medium-scale or large-scale.
III. PROPOSED AN-AIDED SECURE PRECISE
TRANSMISSION METHOD
In the previous section, without the help of AN, we establish
the principle of secure precise transmission by using RSCS,
multiple transmit antennas, and phase alignment, which may
transmit confidential messages to the given desired direction
and distance with a weak signal leakage to other large region
outside the small neighborhood around the given position. In
this section, this scheme, in combination with AN, can further
improve the security of transmitting confidential message.
6y(q) =
NT∑
n=1,η(n)∈SN
(
ρxke
−j2pi(η(n)∆f R−(n−1)d cos θc −
fc(n−1)d cos θ
c )+jφn
N−1∑
m=0
ej2piη(n)∆fm∆T e−j
2pi
N
mq + nk(η(n) − q)
)
(17)
= ρxk
NT∑
n=1,η(n)∈SN
e−j2pi(η(n)∆f
R−(n−1)d cos θ
c
− fc(n−1)d cos θ
c )+jφn sin[pi(η(n)− q)]
sin[ piN (η(n) − q)]
ej
pi
N
(η(n)−q)(N−1) +
NT∑
n=1
nk(n).
Below, we will show how to design the precoding vector
for the confidential message and construct the AN projection
matrix. Here, the AN projection matrix enforces the AN into
the eavesdropper steering space or the null-space of the desired
steering vector with a small fraction or no leakage of AN
power to the desired steering space. Conversely, the precoding
vector for the confidential message is to drive the major power
of confidential message to the desired steering space with a
slight or no leakage to its null-space.
A. General beamforming and AN projection scheme
In terms of the derivation and analysis in Section II, we
first construct the k baseband frequency-domain vector corre-
sponding to transmit antenna m with other NT − 1 antennas
being idle or non-active as follows
sk,m =
√
PS [β1vk(m)xk + β2w˜(m)] eη(m), (31)
where PS is the total transmit power, eη(n) is an N×1 vector
with only element η(n) being one and others being zeros, vk,m
denotes the mth element of the phase alignment/beamforming
vector vk which is to implement the coherent combining at
the desired receiver, and w˜m denotes the mth element of the
AN vector w˜, which equals to Twk. As we can see, T is an
NT ×NT orthogonal projection matrix and wk ∼ CN (0, IN )
is an NT ×1 random vector. In (31), β1 and β2 are two power
allocation (PA)factors and satisfies the constraint β21+β
2
1 = 1,
which ensure that the total transmit power is equal to PS . In
accordance with (31), the kth total transmit spatial-frequency
codeword from is rewritten as
Sk =
√
PSβ1Ekdiag (vk)xk +
√
PSβ2Ekdiag (Twk) ,
(32)
where Ek is an N×NT matrix of random-subcarrier-selection
for transmit antenna array defined as
Ek =
[
eη(1), · · · , eη(m), · · · , eη(NT )
]
, (33)
which is to force more AN into the null-space as possible as
it can and at the same time less even no AN into the useful
signal space consisting of the desired steering vectors. There
are several various rules to optimize vk and T like null-space
projection, leakage and so on. Experiencing the LoP channel,
the N × 1 received vector of frequency-domain data symbols
at position (θ,R) is given by
yk(θ,R) = ρ
√
PS
NT∑
m=1
(34)
a∗(θ,R)(m) [β1vk(m)xk + β2w˜(m)] eη(m) + nk
= ρ
√
PSβ1
{
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m) [vk(m)xk]eη(m)
}
xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful confidential message
+ ρ
√
PSβ2
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)w˜(m)eη(m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artifical noise
+ nk︸︷︷︸
Channel noise
.
In the case of symbol-level precoding, making a summation
of all N subchannels yields
zk(θ,R) =
N∑
n=1
yk(θ,R)(n) (35)
= ρ
√
PSβ1
{
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)vk(m)
}
xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful confidential message uk(θ,R)
+ ρ
√
PSβ2
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)Tmwk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artifical noise w¯k(θ,R)
+
N∑
n=1
nk(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Channel noise n¯k
,
where the final projection vectorTm is themth row of the AN
projection matrix T. The useful confidential signal uk(θ,R),
AN w¯k(θ,R), and channel noise n¯k are assumed to be random
variables with zero mean. Now, we define the average receive
SINR as
SINR(θ,R) =
E{uk(θ,R)u∗k(θ,R)}
E{w¯k(θ,R)w¯∗k(θ,R)} + E{n¯kn¯∗k}
(36)
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θ,R)vk‖2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θ,R)Twk‖2 +Nσ2n
,
which is also proved to be valid for E{w¯k(θ,R)w¯∗k(θ,R)} ≈
E{n¯kn¯∗k} in Appendix A.
In the block-level precoding case, assume the receiver at
position (θ,R) is so smart that it can identify the set of the
NT active subcarrier indices by energy detection algorithm
7similar to cognitive radio [23], the corresponding NT active
subchannels are summed together
zk(θ,R) (37)
= ρ
√
PSβ1
{
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)vk(m)
}
xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful confidential message
+ ρ
√
PSβ2
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)Tmwk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artifical noise
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Channel noise
.
According to the above model and similar to Appendix A, the
average SINR is given by
SINR(θ,R) =
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θ,R)vk‖2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θ,R)Twk‖2 +NTσ2n
. (38)
B. Analysis of receive SINR performance in the case of phase
alignment and null-space projection
In particular, when the ideal desired direction angle and
distance are available, we use a simple beamforming form
vk =
1√
NT
a(θD, RD), (39)
which provides a maximum coherent combining at desired
receiver, and
aH(θD, RD)T = 01×NT , (40)
which projects the AN onto the null-space of the desired
steering vector a(θD, RD). For simplification, Tm is taken
to be the mth row of the following projection matrix
T = INT −
1
NT
a(θD, RD)a
H(θD, RD). (41)
By using the above beamforming scheme, the desired receive
coherent combining signal is
zk(θD, RD) = ρ
√
PSNTβ1xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful confidential message
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Channel noise
, (42)
Due to phase alignment at transmitter, that is, constant-envelop
beamformer with all elements having the same magnitude, we
have the following average SINR
SINR(θD, RD) =
ρ2PSβ
2
1NT
NTσ2n
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1
σ2n
, (43)
since the AN projection matrix at desired receive position is
perpendicular to the desired steering vector. At the eavesdrop-
pers, the receive combining signal is
zk(θE , RE) = ρ
√
PS
NT
β1a
H(θE , RE)a(θD, RD)xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful confidential message
(44)
+ ρ
√
PSβ2a
H(θE , RE)Twk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artifical noise
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Channel noise
.
The SINR expression at undesired position (θE , RE) reduces
to
SINR(θE , RE) (45)
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θE , RE)vk‖2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 +NTσ2n
.
In a practical system, it is preferred that the SINR at desired
position is maximized given that the SINR at eavesdropper
position SINR(θE , RE) is lower than the predefined value like
0dB.
C. Analysis of average secrecy rate
With the help of the definition of average SINR in the
previous subsection, the average secrecy rate of the system
is written as
SR = log2(1 + SINR(θD, RD)) (46)
− max
(θE,RE)∈wiretap area
{log2(1 + SINR(θE , RE))}
subject to : wiretap area ={
(θE , RE)
∣∣|RE −RD| ≥ ∆R, |θE − θD| ≥ ∆θ} ,
where ∆R and ∆θ can refer to the first null position around
the main beam of the desired receiver, which is defined in
Appendix B. The constraint in the above definition denotes
the wiretap region where its complementary set is the desired
region. The above definition of average secrecy rate means
the achievable rate at the desired receiver minus the maximum
rate achievable by eavesdroppers within the wiretap region. In
Appendix B, we derive a tight upper bound on (45)
SINR(θE , RE) (47)
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θE , RE)vk‖2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 +NTσ2n
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θE , RE)a(θD, RD)‖2
NTρ2PSβ22‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 +N2Tσ2n
.
as follows
SINR(θE , RE) (48)
≤ max {SINR(λmax 1), SINR(λmax 2)} ,
which is achievable and a tight upper bound, where parameters
λmax 1 and λmax 2 are given by
λmax 1 =
1
NT
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi(∆fη(n)
REsidelobe
−RD
c
) (49)
· 1
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi(∆fη(n)
REsidelobe
−RD
c
),
λmax 2 =
1
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi(
1
2 (cos θEsidelobe−cos θD)(n−1)) (50)
· 1
NT
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi(
1
2 (cos θEsidelobe−cos θD)(n−1)),
where θEsidelobe and REsidelobeare defined in Appendix B.
Its detailed proving process is presented in Appendix B.
Evidently, by adjusting the values of parameters β1 and β2,
8we may make the SINR value low enough to be unable to be
correctly detected by eavesdropper.
Theorem 1: In a secure precise communication shown
in Fig. 1, if the phase-alignment precoder for confidential
messages in (39) is adopted and the AN null-space projection
method in (41) is used, the average secrecy rate is approxi-
mated by the following formula
SR = log2 (1 + SINR(θD, RD)) (51)
− log2 (1 + max {SINR(λmax 1), SINR(λmax 2)}) ,
where the first term in the right hand side of the above equation
denotes the rate achieved by desired user and the second one
is the upper bound of rate achievable by eavesdropper. 
Proof : The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward by
combining (46), and (48). 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In what follows, the proposed scheme RSCS-OFDM-DM
is evaluated in terms of the average SINR and secrecy rate
performance. In our simulation, system parameters are chosen
as follows: the carrier frequency fc = 3GHz, the total signal
bandwidth B changes from 5MHz to 100MHz, the number
of total subcarriers N = 1024, PS/σ
2
n = 10dB, the antenna
element spacing is half of the wavelength (i.e., d = c/2fc), the
position of the desired receiver is chosen to be (60◦, 500m).
Fig. 3 illustrates the 3-D performance surface of SINR ver-
sus direction angle θ and distance R of the proposed method
of phase alignment/beamforming plus null-space projection in
Section III for three different bandwidths: 5MHz, 20MHz,
and 100MHz. Observing three parts in Fig. 3, the receive
power forms a high useful signal energy peak only around
the desired receiver position (60◦, 500m) due to the joint use
of AN projection and PA. Otherwise, in other undesired region
of excluding the main useful power peak, the receive SINR
is so low that it is smaller than one, due to a weak receive
confidential signal corrupted by AN. Additionally, we also
find an very interesting fact that the width of useful main
peak along distance dimension decreases accordingly as the
signal bandwidth grows from 5MHz to 100MHz. In summary,
a larger signal bandwidth generates a narrower confidential
power peak along distance dimension but has no influence on
the width of peak along direction dimension. This means that
a larger security along distance dimension can be offered by
using a larger signal bandwidth.
Fig. 4 draws the 3-D performance surface of SINR versus
direction angle and distance of the proposed method for three
different numbers of transmit antennas: 8, 32 and 128. Via
three parts (a), (b), and (c) in Fig. 4, we find the following fact
that only single energy peak is synthesized around the desired
receiver position (60◦, 500m) similar to Fig. 3 by beamform-
ing and AN projection. Furthermore, with the increasing in
the number of transmit antennas, the width of the peak along
direction dimension becomes narrower and narrower. This can
be readily explained. Given a fixed antenna spacing, increasing
the number of transmit antenna array will increase antenna
array size and provide a high-spatial-angle-resolution, i.e., a
narrower peak along direction dimension. As the number of
transmit antennas tends to large-scale, the peak converges
to an extremely narrow peak along direction dimension and
perpendicular to the plane along direction dimension. If both
large signal bandwidth B and large-scale transmit antenna
array are used, the peak is formed to narrow along both
direction and distance dimensions. Then, the ultimate aim of
the true secure precise transmission is achieved in terms of the
outcomes in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. That is, the peak converges to
a line perpendicular to the 2-D plane of direction and distance
dimensions and at the desired position.
In Fig. 5, we will evaluate the impact of power allocation pa-
rameters β1 and β2 on the SINR performance. Three different
typical scenarios are considered as follows: (1) β1 < β2 with
β21 = 0.1 and β
2
2 = 0.9, (2) β1 = β2, with β
2
1 = β
2
2 = 0.5,
and (3) β1 > β2 with β
2
1 = 0.9 and β
2
2 = 0.1, which
corresponds to three different parts in Fig. 5. From the three
parts, the maximum value of SINR peak decreases as the value
of β1 decreases. The result is obvious intuitively. Also, the
SINR value outside the main peak approaches zero. Thus,
increasing the value of parameter β2 will further degrade
the SINR performance of eavesdropper regions. Conversely,
increasing the value of parameter β1 will improve the SINR
performance of desired receiver but also lower the security.
Additionally, the values of β1 and β1 are also intimately
related to energy efficiency. Thus, how to choose the values
of β1 and β1 depends on application scenarios and should
consider a balance among energy efficiency, security and
performance.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the curves of derived theoretical and
numerical average secrecy rates versus SNR for three different
numbers NT of transmit antennas. Parts (a), (b), and (c)
correspond to NT = 8, 32, 128, respectively, where each
part includes two different power allocation strategies. In this
figure, the derived theoretical curve is given by (46) while the
simulated numerical curve is the exact SR values by sufficient
Monte Carlo simulation runs. Observing the three parts, the
gap of the simulated curve and the theoretical one disappears
as the number of transmit antennas increases from 8 to 128.
Thus, the derived theoretical SR expression achieves a good
approximation to the exact SR. This also verifies the validness
of our expression in (46). Additionally, in the low and medium
SNR regions, the theoretical curve is also very close to the
numerical one such that they overlap together for three parts.
Below, we make an investigation concerning the impact of
power allocation parameters β1 and β2 on the secrecy rate
performance in Fig. 7. Parts (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the
secrecy rate versus β1 in three different SNR scenarios: (1)
SNR=0dB, (2) SNR=10dB, and (3) SNR=20dB, respectively.
Observing the three parts, we first find that the gap between
AN-aided method and non-AN-aided method decreases as the
number of transmit antennas increases, where the non-AN-
aided implies β2 = 0 and no AN. In Part (a), that is, in low
SNR region and with large number of antennas, the influence
of AN is weak due to a large channel noise. However, as SNR
increases , the AN becomes more and more important. In Parts
(b) and (c), as the value of β1 varies from 0 to 1, the average
SR curve is a concave function of β1. There exists an optimal
power allocation strategy of maximizing the SR. As SNR
9increases, the optimal power allocation factor β1 decreases.
A high SNR means a good desired channel quality. In other
words, for a high SNR scenario, more power may be used
to transmit artificial noise(AN) to corrupt the eavesdroppers
while less power is adopted to transmit confidential message.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the RSCS-OFDM-DM scheme is proposed
to achieve an ultimate goal of secure precise transmission
of confidential messages. To accomplish this goal, several
important tools are utilized like: random subcarrier selection,
phase alignment/beamforming for confidential messages, and
null-space projection of AN. Using this scheme, we obtain
the following interesting results: 1) the proposed scheme
can generate a high SINR peak only at the desired position
(θD, RD) and a low flat SINR plane for other eavesdropper
regions with SINR being far less than the former, 2) the
widths of main peak along angle and distance dimensions
are intimately related to the number of antennas NT and
bandwidth B, respectively. Increasing B and NT will achieve
a narrower and narrower main peak along both direction
and distance dimensions at desired position, 3) increasing the
fraction of AN power in the total transmit power will gradually
degrade the SINR performance of eavesdropper at the expense
of that of desired user. The final result is as follows: at
eavesdroppers, the received power of confidential messages
is very weak and corrupted by AN, thus their receive SINR is
so poor that the confidential messages can not be successfully
and reliably intercepted outside main peak at the desired
position, and the transmit confidential power mainly gathers in
a small neighbourhood around the desired position, where only
a small fraction of the total power leaks out to eavesdropper
regions. The proposed RSCS-OFDM-DM scheme is easy to be
implemented compared to the conventional RFDA proposed in
[18]. Finally, we also derive the tight upper bound for SINR in
wiretap region. By using this bound, we attain the approximate
expression for average secrecy rate. Simulation results and
analysis confirm that the derived theoretical expression of
average secrecy rate is a good approximation to the exact
average SR. Due to the low-complexity and high security of
the proposed scheme, it will be potentially applied in the future
scenarios including unmanned aerial vehicle communications,
satellite communications, mm-Wave communications and so
on.
APPENDIX A
APPROXIMATE DERIVATION OF MEAN OF SINR(θ,R) FOR
σ2CN/2 ≈ σ2AN/2
In the position (θ,R), consider
uk(θ,R) = ρ
√
PSβ1
{
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)vk(m)
}
xk, (52)
and
gk(θ,R) = w¯k(θ,R) + n¯k (53)
= ρ
√
PSβ2
NT∑
m=1
a∗(θ,R)(m)Tmwk︸ ︷︷ ︸
gk,AN (θ,R)
+
NT∑
n=1
nk(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gk,CN (θ,R)
.
where channel noise is abbreviated as CN. Firstly, let us ad-
dress the problem of PDF of random variable uk(θ,R). Three
random variables uk(θ,R), gk,AN (θ,R), and gk,CN (θ,R)
are the sum of NT random variables. In order to simplify
the following deriving, they are approximately modelled as
complex Gaussian distributions in terms of the central limit
theorem in probability theory. From (52) and (53), their means
and variances are
E{uk(θ,R)} = 0, E{gk,AN (θ,R)} = 0, (54)
E{gk,CN (θ,R)} = 0,
and
σ2u = E{uk(θ,R)u∗k(θ,R)} = ρ2PSβ21‖aH(θ,R)vk‖2, (55)
σ2AN = NTPSρ
2β22σ
2
w
NT∑
m=1
‖a∗(θ,R)(m)‖2TmTHm, (56)
σ2CN = NTσ
2
n.
Considering the real-time SINR γ is approximately given by
γ =
uk(θ,R)u
∗
k(θ,R)
gk,AN (θ,R)g∗k,AN (θ,R) + gk,CNg
∗
k,CN
. (57)
In accordance with the above definition, let define the three
new random variables as follows
α =
uk(θ,R)u
∗
k(θ,R)
σ2u/2
, (58)
β =
gk,AN (θ,R)g
∗
k,AN (θ,R)
σ2AN/2
,
λ =
gk,CNg
∗
k,CN
σ2CN/2
,
which are three Chi-squared distribution with two degrees of
freedom. Without losing generality, putting the above variables
in (57) yields
γ =
σ2u
2 α
σ2AN
2 β +
σ2CN
2 λ
= e • α
aβ + bλ
, (59)
where e = σ2u/2, a = σ
2
AN/2, b = σ
2
CN/2, three random
variables α, β and λ have the same PDF as follows [24]
fα(x) = fβ(x) = fλ(x) =
1
2
exp(−1
2
x). (60)
Below, we discuss one typical situation: σ2CN/2 ≈ σ2AN/2.
In this scenario, we will give an approximation of the PDF of
random variable γ. The distribution of aβ+bλ(a+b) is approximately
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regarded as one Chi-squared distribution with four degrees of
freedom. Then, the SINR in (59) is rewritten by
γ =
σ2u
2 α
σ2
AN
2 β +
σ2
CN
2 λ
=
eα
aβ + bλ
=
e
2(a+ b)
• α/2
q/4︸︷︷︸
γ˜
, (61)
From the definition of F -distribution, we have the PDF of γ˜
as follows
fγ˜(x) =
1(
1 + 12x
)3 , (62)
which leads to the PDF of random variable γ
fγ(x) =
2(a+ b)
e
1(
1 + (a+b)e x
)3 , x > 0 (63)
which yields the average value of SINR γ
γ¯ = E{γ} = 2(a+ b)
e
∫ +∞
0
x(
1 + (a+b)e x
)3 dx. (64)
Let us define a new integral variable x′ =
(
1 + (a+b)e x
)
, then
the above integral can be converted into
γ¯ =
2e
a+ b
∫ +∞
1
x′ − 1
(x′)3
dx′ =
e
a+ b
. (65)
by checking the integral table in [25], [26]. This completes
the proof of the PDF of SINR and its mean. 
APPENDIX B
TIGHT UPPER BOUND OF SINR(θE , RE)
In this Appendix, a tight upper bound for the receive SINR
in eavesdropper region is proved. By means of the SINR
definition in (45), the SINR SINR(θE , RE) is rewritten as
SINR(θE , RE) =
ρ2PSβ
2
1‖aH(θE , RE) 1√NT a(θD, RD)‖
2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 +NTσ2n
(66)
=
ρ2PSβ
2
1/NT ‖aH(θE , RE)a(θD, RD)‖2
ρ2PSβ22‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 +NTσ2n
,
where
aH(θE , RE)a(θD, RD) =
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi∆θn , (67)
aH(θD, RD)a(θE , RE) =
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi∆θn , (68)
with
∆θn (69)
= ∆fη(n)
RE −RD
c
− 1
2
(cos θE − cos θD) (n− 1),
and
‖aH(θE , RE)Twk‖2 = aH(θE , RE)Ta(θE , RE) (70)
= NT − 1
NT
aH(θE , RE)a(θD.RD)a
H(θD, RD)a(θE , RE).
Let us define
λ =
1
NT
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi∆θn · 1
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi∆θn . (71)
which ensures that 0 ≤ λ < 1. Then,
SINR(θE , RE) =
µ1λ
µ2(1 − λ) + µ3 , (72)
where µ1 = ρ
2PSβ
2
1 , µ2 = ρ
2PSβ
2
2 and µ3 = σ
2
n. Obviously,
the above function SINR(θE , RE) is an increasing function of
independent variable λ for given fixed µ1 = ρ
2PSβ
2
1 , µ2 =
ρ2PSβ
2
2 and µ3 = σ
2
n. As λ varies from 0 to 1, the range of
this function is [
µ1λ
µ2 + µ3
,
µ1λ
µ3
]
. (73)
where λ = 1 implies that the receiver locates at the desired
position. In what follows, we will determine the maximum
value of λ when the eavesdropper lies in wiretap region. It
is certain that the maximum value of λ is smaller than one
since the eavesdropper is assumed to be outside the main-
beam around the desired position (θD, RD). Here, we define
the wiretap region as all region outside main-peak of SINR
around the desired position (θD, RD). Now, to make the
wiretap region approximately clear, we should compute the
first nulls of SINR along phase and distance dimensions. In
such positions, λ = 0. In other words, the lowest value of
SINR is reached. The null points of array pattern along the
direction dimension satisfy the following condition [27]
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi∆θn =
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi
1
2 (cos θE−cos θD)(n−1) (74)
=
1− ejpi(cos θE−cos θD)NT
1− ejpi(cos θE−cos θD) = 0,
which yields
NTpi(cos θE − cos θD) = ±2Kpi, (75)
K 6= mNT (m = 1, 2, 3, ...).
In the same manner, the null points along the distance dimen-
sion are
2piNT
B
NT
RE −RD
c
= ±2Kpi, (76)
K 6= mNT (m = 1, 2, 3, ...).
When K = 1, we will get the first-null position
θEzero = arccos(cos θD ±
2
NT
), (77)
REzero = RD ±
c
B
. (78)
Then, ∆θ = |θEzero − θD| and ∆R = |REzero − RD|. While
λ = λmax, we can get the maximum value of SINR(θE , RE)
in the eavesdropper region. Hence, once the eavesdropper
located at the peak position of the first side lobe, λ will
achieve the maximum value. The maximum value of the
sidelobe falls between the first and second nulls. As for the
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direction dimension, the maximum values of sidelobes are
approximately equivalent to
sin(pi(cos θE − cos θD)NT /2) = 1. (79)
which yields
pi(cos θE − cos θD)NT
2
= ±(2K + 1)pi
2
, (K = 1, 2, 3...).
(80)
Similar to the above analysis, the condition associated with
the distance dimension satisfies
2pi
B
NT
RE −RD
c
NT
2
= ±(2K + 1)pi
2
, (K = 1, 2, 3...).
(81)
When K = 1, we will get two maximum values corresponding
to two first sidelobes along phase and distance dimensions as
follows
θEsidelobe = arccos(cos θD ±
3
NT
), (82)
REsidelobe = RD ±
3c
2B
, (83)
which yields
λmax 1 =
1
NT
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi(∆fη(n)
REsidelobe
−RD
c
) (84)
· 1
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi(∆fη(n)
REsidelobe
−RD
c
),
λmax 2 =
1
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi(
1
2 (cos θEsidelobe−cos θD)(n−1)) (85)
· 1
NT
NT∑
n=1
e−j2pi(
1
2 (cos θEsidelobe−cos θD)(n−1)).
Hence,
SINR(θE , RE) (86)
≤ max {SINR(λmax 1), SINR(λmax 2)} .
This completes the proof of the tight upper bound. 
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Fig. 3. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed method for NT = 8 (PS/σ
2
n = 10dB, β
2
1
= β2
2
= 0.5). Fig. 4. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed method for B=5MHz (PS/σ
2
n = 10dB, β
2
1
= β2
2
= 0.5).
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Fig. 5. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed method for B=5MHz, and NT = 32 (PS/σ
2
n = 10dB).
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(b) NT = 32
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(c) NT = 128
Fig. 6. Curves of secrecy rate versus SNR(10 log10(PS/σ
2
n)) of the proposed
scheme, where B = 5MHz.
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Fig. 7. Curves of theoretical and numerical average secrecy rate versus β2
1
,
where B = 5MHz.
